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ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND JUDICIAL BUCKPASSING: THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
WHISTLEBLOWERS
Heidi Kitrosser*
INTRODUCTION
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that public employees
have no First Amendment protections for speech made “pursuant to their
official duties.”1 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy assured readers
that the holding did not undermine “the potential societal value of employee
speech.”2 Among other things, Kennedy pointed to a “powerful network of
legislative enactments—such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor
codes—available to [public employees] who seek to expose wrongdoing.”3
Yet as Justice Souter pointed out in dissent and as several amici had informed
the Court in their briefs, “the combined variants of statutory whistle-blower
definitions and protections add up to a patchwork, not a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief.”4 Indeed, in 2006—the year
that Garcetti was handed down—federal employees lacked statutory protection for speech made pursuant to their official duties, and it was unclear in
many states whether state employees were entitled to such protections.5
This aspect of Garcetti illustrates several difficulties that can arise when
courts point to statutory protections to soften the perceived impact of limits
on constitutional guarantees. First, courts may simply get their facts wrong,
misrepresenting the lay of the legislative land. The same court or other
© 2019 Heidi Kitrosser. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Heidi Kitrosser, Robins Kaplan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School. Thank you to the Notre Dame students and faculty for a wonderful Symposium.
1 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
2 Id. at 422.
3 Id. at 425.
4 Id. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting).
5 See infra Section II.A.
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courts may compound the error, repeating it as an article of faith in subsequent opinions. Even if a court correctly describes the existing statutory picture, the picture may change while courts continue to point uncritically to
the original description, and while the constitutional doctrine that it helped
to justify remains in place. Indeed, a number of lower courts have relied on
Garcetti’s assurance of a “powerful network of legislative enactments” to
soften the perceived impact of their own denials of First Amendment claims.6
Second and more fundamentally, courts may highlight potential legislative solutions partly to gloss over weaknesses in their constitutional reasoning.
For example, the Garcetti Court suggested, at points, that there is little of
value at stake when public employees speak in their capacities as employees.7
Yet that reasoning flies in the face of the Court’s acknowledgment elsewhere
in Garcetti and in earlier cases that public employee speech has constitutional
value largely because of the expertise that employees acquire on the job.8
Concluding that there is no constitutional right at stake while assuring that
robust legislative protections exist seems but a feeble attempt to have it both
ways.
Finally, weak constitutional reasoning about the claimed right at stake
can lend itself to equally dubious analysis about the relative advantages of
statutory versus constitutional protections for that right. In Garcetti, for
example, the Court not only downplayed public employees’ unique contributions, through their work product, to discourse about matters of public concern, it also overlooked a core assumption manifest elsewhere throughout
First Amendment precedent—namely, that government actors are highly
motivated to suppress information that they find embarrassing or politically
inconvenient.9 Ignoring that predictive insight made it easier for the Court
to conclude not only that the right at issue was not of constitutional dimension, but that the political branches could be trusted to protect it.
In this Article, I consider the influence that actual or potential statutory
protections do, should, and should not have on judicial decisions about the
scope of constitutional protections, looking predominantly through the lens
of public employees’ First Amendment rights. In Part I, I reflect on several
areas in which the Supreme Court has incorporated the existence or potential existence of statutory protections into its constitutional reasoning. In
Part II, I assess the Supreme Court’s use of statutory protections to help justify limits on public employees’ First Amendment rights in Garcetti. I explain
that the Court made questionable factual assumptions about the statutory
landscape. Its constitutional analysis was more precarious still, as was its
related reasoning as to why it could comfortably rely on legislative protections. In Part III, I look at judicial citations to Garcetti’s language about the
“powerful network of legislative enactments” over the past twelve years. Most
6
7
8
Public
9

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425; see infra Part III.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra text accompanying note 58; see also Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of
Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 309–12.
See infra Part II.
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courts have simply taken Garcetti’s factual assertion as an article of faith.
Some also have reiterated Garcetti’s reasoning to the effect that statutory protections are more fitting vehicles than the Constitution to protect public
employee speech rights. In Part IV, I consider the relationship that ideally
should exist between constitutional and statutory protections for public
employee speech.
I. HOW STATE OR FEDERAL LAWS OR PRACTICES CAN IMPACT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
It is an oversimplification to suggest, as Justice Souter did in his dissent
in Garcetti, that “[t]he applicability of a provision of the Constitution has
never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law.”10 This Part briefly
reviews several settings in which the Supreme Court or individual Justices
have surveyed the statutory landscape to inform their determinations of the
scope of constitutional protections. The examples demonstrate that it can be
reasonable, even necessary, to consult statutes—as well as related authorities
including regulations and professional norms to which a statutory program
refers—in the course of shaping constitutional guarantees and remedies. Yet
the examples also reflect perils of the enterprise. Potential missteps include
misreading external authorities, neglecting to revisit doctrine when those
authorities change, misunderstanding the relationship between the extraconstitutional authorities and the constitutional question presented, or invoking
the authorities in a manner that undermines the constitutional provisions
themselves.
A.

Developments as Bases to Expand or Contract Protections in Due Process
and Equal Protection Cases

The constitutional doctrines of equal protection and substantive due
process have robust but complicated relationships to legislative authorities.
In the equal protection context, Supreme Court Justices at times have
deemed protective legislation for particular groups to signify that the groups
have political power and thus are not “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classes that
require enhanced judicial attention. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, for instance, the Court cited federal and state legislative accommodations for cognitively disabled persons as indicia that the group does not need
courts to apply heightened scrutiny to laws that treat them differently from
others.11 Elsewhere, the Court has engaged in the flip side of this inquiry: it
has asked whether laws historically have been passed to disadvantage particu10 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Bd.
of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996)).
11 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–43 (1985); cf. Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645–46, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deeming it “preposterous”
for the majority to call gays and lesbians “politically unpopular” when the group “enjoys
enormous influence in American media and politics,” and citing examples of legislative
protections to support this point).
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lar groups and counted affirmative answers as factors favoring heightened
review of classifications targeting those groups.12
Complicating matters further, members of the Court at times have cited
statutes that protect particular groups or activities to justify its own safeguarding of those same groups or actions. In the context of gender-based equal
protection claims, for example, the Court has referenced the easing of statutory restraints on women’s participation in economic and civic life over the
course of the twentieth century.13 This evolution, it explains, reflects a growing understanding that such restraints are unsupported by real differences
between men and women.14 The legislative transformation thus justifies
heightened judicial skepticism toward gender-based laws.15
In the substantive due process context, some Justices have cited longstanding statutory restraints on personal decisionmaking—for instance,
choices about one’s intimate partners—to argue that the liberty to make
such decisions is not so constitutionally salient as to warrant protection under
the Due Process Clause.16 Other Justices have contested those historical
understandings; they also have pointed to more protective modern statutes
to demonstrate that those liberties have become highly valued and warrant
strong constitutional protection.17
These examples illustrate the reasonableness, if not inevitability, of looking at past and present statutory terrain to give content to some constitutional provisions. “Liberty” and “equal protection” are not self-defining
terms. There is a logic to looking, for example, at evidence that certain personal choices are widely prized, or that certain groups are more or less likely
to need judicial protection in light of their relative political strength.
The examples also demonstrate the frequently tight connection between
judicial use of extraconstitutional authorities and a judge’s approach to constitutional interpretation. In the substantive due process context, for example, Justices have clashed over whether the current statutory landscape is
constitutionally relevant, or whether interpreters should consider only the
state of the law during or prior to a constitutional provision’s drafting and
ratification.18 In the equal protection setting, one might worry that Justices
12 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (explaining that heightened scrutiny in gender discrimination cases is warranted in light of “volumes of history,”
including discriminatory statutes and judicial decisions upholding the same).
13 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973).
14 See id. at 685–87.
15 See id. at 687–88 (deeming it relevant to the standard of review that, “over the past
decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based
classifications”).
16 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193–94 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
17 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567–77.
18 Compare, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (explaining that the
Court has “insisted” that any liberty deemed “fundamental” be one that is “traditionally
protected by our society”), with id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice
Scalia’s opinion for “plac[ing] a discernible border around the Constitution,” and disput-
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will see the forest and miss the trees, deeming a group politically powerful in
light of legislation not directly at issue, while overlooking discrimination that
is manifest in the statute under review.19
Finally, it often is difficult to discern just what the statutory landscape is
or was at any given time. This problem is particularly evident where Justices
in the same case dispute one another’s interpretation of the facts. We see
this, for example, in the debate between the majority and dissenting Justices
in Lawrence v. Texas over the history of antisodomy laws.20 Among the challenges in this and other cases is determining just what statutes are relevant to
the legal questions at issue, how to address rarely enforced statutes, and
whether there is some numerical threshold—a majority of states, for example—that must be reached in any given case.21
B.

Defining the Contents of the Government’s Own Creations

Another set of examples follows from courts’ rejection of the rights-privilege distinction in the mid-twentieth century.22 With this move, courts took
upon themselves the task of examining public programs’ features to determine what constitutional constraints apply to them. Justice Scalia referenced
this reality in a 1996 dissent in which he objected, among other things, to the
majority’s remark—which Justice Souter would later quote in Garcetti23—that
“[t]he applicability of a provision of the Constitution has never depended on
ing that “a search for ‘tradition’ involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than
poring through dusty volumes on American history”).
19 In Cleburne, the Court arguably avoided that problem by applying an unusually
searching version of rational basis review (elsewhere called “rational basis with bite”) and
holding the challenged action unconstitutional. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 446–50 (1985); see also, e.g., Note, The Benefits of Unequal Protection, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1348, 1363 (2013) (explaining that “[c]ommentators—and, in a few rare instances,
courts—have identified a wide range of cases employing rational basis with bite,” and that
Cleburne is among the “five ‘classical’ rational basis with bite cases”).
20 Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567–77, with id. at 595–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21 See, e.g., David Crump, How Do Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental
Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 862
(1996) (“[T]he apparent objectivity of the history-and-tradition method [of discerning
unenumerated fundamental rights] is less obvious when one considers what sources are to
be consulted.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and Critique of
the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 923, 927–28 (2006) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has been remarkably inconsistent, even sloppy, in its application of the tradition test” in fundamental rights
cases—its methods have included, among other things, “reviewing Anglo-American legal
practices and the common law in the states,” and “counting the number of states”).
22 For a classic examination of the role of government largesse in the law, including
the traditional distinction between rights and privileges and early developments imposing
some constitutional restraints on government’s ability to attach conditions to its largesse,
see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739–40, 778–82 (1964).
23 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 439 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bd.
of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996)).
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the vagaries of state or federal law.”24 Scalia observed, in response, that a
“property interest entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection” arises not
from the Constitution itself, but from “existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law.”25
In the context of public employee speech cases, the distinction between
rights and privileges was epitomized by the statement—made by Oliver Wendell Holmes when he was a justice on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court—that “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”26 After courts abandoned such reasoning and subjected public employers to First Amendment
limits on their disciplinary powers, jurists had to find ways to discern the
nature of particular jobs. Only then could they determine the impact that an
employee’s speech might have had on her workplace,27 or, after Garcetti,
whether an employee spoke in her on-the-job capacity. Such judicial inquiries necessarily draw upon extraconstitutional authorities, including statutes,
regulations, subregulatory job descriptions, and professional norms.
Similarly, in the context of government subsidies for expressive activity,
courts look closely at the contours of the subsidized programs to determine
whether they amount to “government speech” and thus are unconstrained by
the First Amendment,28 or whether they constitute vehicles for private
expression and are subject to some First Amendment restrictions.29 In making these assessments, courts have little choice but to consult statutory and
regulatory authorities, among other extraconstitutional sources of
information.
Although it is sensible for courts to consult extraconstitutional authorities to determine the scope and nature of government programs to which
constitutional protections might apply, the task is fraught with opportunities
for error and manipulation. For example, the Supreme Court has increasingly displayed a willingness to characterize as “government speech”—and
thus free from the constraints of the First Amendment—expression that is
created by private actors that is not “transparently presented as having been
shaped by the government” and that onlookers would have reason to believe
24 Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 299
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
25 Id. (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 n.7 (1972)).
26 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
27 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (explaining that courts
must weigh, case by case, the “interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees,” against the speech
interests at stake).
28 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198–204
(2016) (summarizing government speech doctrine).
29 See id. at 1200–04 (noting distinction in the caselaw between government speech
and government programs that are vehicles for private speech).
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represents the private creators’ professional or artistic judgments.30 These
characterizations might reflect Justices’ genuine but questionable judgments
that the subsidy programs at issue simply are vehicles through which the government conveys its own messages. More cynically, they might reflect a
desire to narrow the realm of subsidized speech to which First Amendment
protections apply and to use the government speech label as a means to that
end. In either event, this phenomenon illustrates some of the perils of courts
relying on extraconstitutional authorities—and on their own interpretations
thereof—in shaping and applying constitutional guarantees.
C.

Bivens Actions and Limits Thereupon

In a number of cases, courts also have deemed the existence of statutory
remedies to preclude constitutional damages suits against federal officers acting in their official capacities. Although courts long have taken the view that
no federal statute creates a general right of action to bring such suits,31 they
have, since the 1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,32 held that the Constitution itself can support such
actions.33 Yet in the decades since Bivens, courts have placed substantial limits on parties’ abilities to bring such cases. While early post-Bivens cases
reflected a rebuttable presumption in favor of constitutional damages
30 See Kitrosser, supra note 8, at 328; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When
Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 666 (2008) (criticizing the
Supreme Court for “shatter[ing] the bargain where the government may promote certain
positions to the exclusion of others but only on the condition that the electorate can hold
the government accountable for its advocacy”); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee
Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1,
28 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has too often characterized speech as governmental
without requiring the government to signal the origin of its speech in a way that allows the
public meaningfully to evaluate the message and its source.”); Papandrea, supra note 28, at
1228 (“Walker is potentially dangerous because it will give the government much greater
ability to restrict private speech whenever the government wants to avoid the appearance
that it endorses it.”).
31 They have concluded, in other words, that there is no analogue, for federal officials,
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), which grants a right of action in damages suits for abuses
carried out “under color of state law.” See John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy,
95 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1670 (2009). But see James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking
Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 123 (2009) (arguing that
the 1988 Westfall Act “puts the Bivens action on a much firmer federal statutory foundation, analogous if not identical to § 1983,” which authorizes suits against state government
actors).
32 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
33 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. 388); see also
Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is
Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 725–27 (2012) (explaining that injunctive
remedies were available prior to Bivens, and that damages actions often were available earlier in American history).

R
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actions,34 more recent cases “suggest that where sub-constitutional law is
available for relief, the Constitution is unavailable.”35
In one of the most important post-Bivens cases, 1983’s Bush v. Lucas, the
Supreme Court held that federal statutory civil service protections implicitly
preclude damages actions against federal employers for First Amendment
violations.36 The Lucas Court found that the civil service laws, including the
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978, create an “elaborate” and “comprehensive” framework,37 within which public employees’ First Amendment
claims “are fully cognizable.”38 Although the Court assumed, arguendo, that
the remedies available within this framework were not “as effective as an individual damages remedy,”39 it declined to authorize suits for damages.
The Lucas Court reasoned, in short, that existing statutes provided
ample recourse for any First Amendment violations suffered by federal
employees, and that Congress, not the courts, should judge the wisdom of
any additional remedies.40 It stressed that the question was one of “federal
personnel policy,”41 and that the “policy judgment should be informed by a
thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of another remedy
for violations of employees’ First Amendment rights.”42 The Court also
expressed confidence in Congress’s appreciation of the speech values at
stake. Congress, it observed, “has a special interest in informing itself about
the efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level [g]overnment employees are a valuable
source of information, and that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates’ freedom of expression.”43
Even if one agrees, in principle, that courts should infer remedial exclusivity from detailed statutory schemes that encompass constitutional claims,
the Lucas case illustrates two risks in implementing this approach. First,
courts may overestimate the adequacy of particular statutory frameworks.
Indeed, the federal legislation on which the Lucas Court relied was a dead
34 See Bernstein, supra note 33, at 734–36.
35 Preis, supra note 31, at 1666; see also Bernstein, supra note 33, at 736–41, 744–51.
36 Lucas, 462 U.S. at 368.
37 Id. at 385.
38 Id. at 385–86; see also Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1124 (noting that by statute, “federal civil servants are able
to bring First Amendment claims . . . for personnel decisions based on the employee’s
disapproving or controversial comments about the agency”).
39 Lucas, 462 U.S. at 372.
40 See id. at 388 (“The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a
wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system
that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.”).
41 Id. at 380–81.
42 Id. at 388.
43 Id. at 389.
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end, effectively, for federal employees alleging First Amendment violations.
According to a 2008 study by Professor Paul Secunda, “not a single First
Amendment . . . claim filed by a federal employee against the employee’s
agency” had, by that point, “ever been successful on the merits before either”
the adjudicative appeals board—the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB)—established by the CSRA or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was the exclusive venue for appeals from the MSPB until
2012.44 This startling record was attributable partly to structural features of
the CSRA’s adjudicative framework. Rather than initiating their cases before
a federal district court judge, federal employees had to choose between a
union grievance procedure, if one was available to them, or a hearing before
an Administrative Judge (AJ) who lacked salary and tenure protections and
was appointed by the MSPB.45 An AJ decision could be appealed to the
MSPB, whose members have greater independence than AJs but who are
more vulnerable to the political winds than are Article III judges.46 From the
MSPB—or directly following the AJ’s decision—federal employees could
appeal only to the Federal Circuit.47 That court has taken notoriously narrow views of both constitutional and statutory speech protections for federal
employees.48 Thus, even if the remedies theoretically available to federal
employees through the CSRA were adequate, there were weighty reasons—
both before and after Lucas—to doubt that it gave federal employees a meaningful opportunity to adjudicate liability.49
Second, courts’ assessments of the adequacy of statutory remedies may
be colored by their ambivalence about the importance of the substantive
rights at stake. Indeed, the Lucas Court likened the question before it to
those raised by earlier cases that did not involve constitutional rights at all.
The Court acknowledged that, unlike those earlier cases, Lucas “concerns a
claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Nevertheless, just as those
44 Secunda, supra note 38, at 1103; see also S. REP. NO. 112-155, at 1–2 (2012) (noting
that the Federal Circuit was the exclusive federal court of appeals for CSRA claims until the
2012 passage of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act).
45 See Secunda, supra note 38, at 1124.
46 See id. at 1125. For example, each of the three members is appointed for a single
term of seven years. As of shortly before this Article’s publication, the Board had zero
members, due partly to partisan politics. See infra notes 136, 140.
47 Id.
48 See S. REP. NO. 112-155, at 1–2 (“[F]ederal whistleblowers have seen their protections diminish in recent years, largely as a result of a series of decisions by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over many cases
brought under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).”); id. at 26 (“In recent years, both
the MSPB and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have repeatedly applied the WPA in a
manner inconsistent with congressional intent.”).
49 Indeed, the very low number of First Amendment claims brought by public employees under the CSRA likely reflected their reasonable beliefs that those claims would “not
be treated seriously.” Secunda, supra note 38, at 1104; see also S. REP. NO. 112-155, at 26
(“According to Thomas Devine, Legal Director of the Government Accountability Project,
certain decisions by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals that narrowly
interpret the WPA have undermined employees’ confidence in the Board process.”).
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cases involved ‘federal fiscal policy’ and the relations between [g]overnment
and its employees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may
appropriately be characterized as one of ‘federal personnel policy.’”50 More
so, the Lucas Court expressed confidence that Congress would give ample
weight to the First Amendment interests at stake, given its demonstrated
awareness, in the past, “that lower-level [g]overnment employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might improperly attempt to
curtail their subordinates’ freedom of expression.”51 The Court’s sanguinity
about Congress’s role overlooked the reality of Congress’s mixed record in
protecting public employee speech rights. It also elided the substantial role
played by the executive branch in administering statutory protections.52
More fundamentally, it was at odds with a central theme throughout much
free speech theory and doctrine—that we must be ever wary of government
attempts to police speech, particularly speech about itself.53
II. PASSING

THE

BUCK

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court made several missteps when it
assured critics that the impact of its decision would be limited, given the
“powerful network of legislative enactments—such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes—available to [public employees] who seek to
expose wrongdoing.”54 Most glaringly, the Court exaggerated the strength
and breadth of such laws. The Court’s assurance about legislative protections
also enabled weaker aspects of the Court’s constitutional reasoning; that is,
the former seemed aimed partly toward compensating for or justifying the
latter.
A.

Inaccurate Depictions of Relevant Legislation

For federal employees, as we saw above, the CSRA provided little in the
way of a meaningful opportunity to raise whatever First Amendment rights
they did possess. Nor did the CSRA’s substantive statutory protections go
very far to fill that gap. Indeed, the Federal Circuit—which, again, was the
sole federal court with jurisdiction over CSRA cases until 2012—interpreted
the CSRA to exclude from its coverage speech engaged in as part of one’s
job.55 This was, of course, precisely the type of speech that the Garcetti Court
deemed constitutionally unprotected. The Federal Circuit’s interpretation
50 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004).
51 Id. at 389.
52 See supra text accompanying notes 45–46 (citing reliance of whistleblower protection laws on AJs and MSPB); see also Charles S. Clark, Newly Installed Special Counsel Wants to
Adjudicate Cases More Swiftly, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/
oversight/2017/12/newly-installed-special-counsel-wants-adjudicate-cases-more-swiftly/144
431/ (describing the important role played by the Office of Special Counsel).
53 See infra Section IV.A.
54 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
55 Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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prevailed for fourteen years—from its opinion’s issuance in 1998 until Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012.56
Amici had alerted the Garcetti Court to the fact that the CSRA did not
“cover[ ] speech that is part of carrying out assigned duties.”57 In the aftermath of Garcetti, too, many commentators pointed to the absence of statutory—or, by that point, constitutional—protection for whistleblowing
engaged in by federal employees in the course of performing their duties.58
The Garcetti majority’s faith in a “powerful network” also was belied by
the spottiness of state protections. Justice Souter made this point in dissent,
characterizing the combined protections of state and federal whistleblower
laws as “a patchwork, not a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief.”59 Several organizations similarly informed the Court of this
reality in an amicus brief.60 Commentators also echoed and elaborated on
this point in the wake of Garcetti. For example, in congressional testimony
delivered shortly after Garcetti was decided, Stephen Kohn of the National
Whistleblower Center explained that “58% of state whistleblower laws do not
explicitly protect internal/official duty whistleblowers . . . . [O]f states which
provide some protection for internal/official duty whistleblowers, 95% . . .
provide whistleblowers with less procedural and/or remedial protection”
than they could receive by bringing a constitutional claim under Section
1983.61
Despite abundant evidence of a more complicated reality, the Supreme
Court reiterated Garcetti’s “powerful network” language in its 2011 opinion in
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri.62 The Guarnieri Court cited the language to
56 See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
57 Brief for Gov’t Accountability Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Resondent
at 22, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473); see also Brief for Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19 n.22, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473)
(“Courts have denied whistleblower protection to employees who are performing their
normally assigned duties in reporting waste, fraud and abuse.”).
58 For example, the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform held a hearing on
Garcetti shortly after it was decided. Several of the witnesses criticized the Garcetti Court for
overstating the robustness of statutory protections. They cited weaknesses in the WPA and
judicial interpretations thereof, including the lack of coverage for work product speech.
What Price Free Speech? Whistleblowers and the Ceballos Decision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 13–17 (2006) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep. Henry
Waxman); id. at 28–52 (statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National Whistleblowers
Center); id. at 76, 79–80 (statement of William Bransford, General Counsel, Senior Executives Association); id. at 102, 109–10 (statement of Barbara Atkin, Deputy General Counsel,
National Treasury Employees Union); id. at 207, 210 (statement of Joe Goldberg, Assistant
General Counsel for Litigation, American Federation of Government Employees).
59 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60 Brief for Gov’t Accountability Project, supra note 57, at 20–21.
61 Hearings, supra note 58, at 32–33 (statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National
Whistleblowers Center). Kohn also found that “of the states which provided some form of
protection for internal whistleblowers, six states actually require the employees to contact
their supervisors as a condition of receiving protection under state law.” Id. at 33.
62 564 U.S. 379 (2011).
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draw an analogy between whistleblower rights laws and measures that protect
public employees more broadly,63 but gave no indication of a need to
rethink the statement’s factual foundations. More so, as we shall see in Part
III, many lower courts have cited the “powerful network” language over the
years, effectively reasserting the factual claim that it encompasses.
B.

The Link to Weak Constitutional Reasoning

Elsewhere, I have detailed a number of weaknesses in the Garcetti Court’s
legal reasoning.64 In this Section, I highlight three such vulnerabilities and
link them to the Court’s assurance about the availability of robust statutory
protections. My point is not that the “powerful network” language itself gave
rise to these analytical weaknesses. The language does, however, play an enabling role insofar as it seems aimed toward compensating for, deflecting
attention from, or even justifying each weakness.
The most fundamental of Garcetti’s analytical difficulties is its enervated
conception of the social value of public employee speech. The Garcetti Court
acknowledges, as it has consistently done throughout its public employee
speech cases, that “the First Amendment interests at stake extend beyond the
individual speaker,” to “the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed
views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.”65 The Court
denies that its opinion undermines these interests, explaining that its
“[r]efus[al] to recognize First Amendment claims based on government
employees’ work product does not prevent them from participating in public
debate.”66 This assurance, however, overlooks how much the “special value”
of public employee speech—as the Court calls it in a subsequent case67—
relies on the unique channels to which employees have access as employees,
and the impact on public debate of speech conveyed through those channels. For example, a government scientist tasked to draft a report on climate
change, or a government economist charged to project the impact of a proposed bill, may write directly for public consumption. Even when they write
for an internal audience or engage in internal discussions and debates about
their reasoning and conclusions, these communications can help to shape
public debate. The impact may take the form, for example, of subsequent
drafts of the initial work product, public testimony based on that product, or
tacit references to the same by government officials. Even internal communications not directly linkable to eventual public statements—for instance,
internal reports of corruption—can serve important checking functions by
63 Id. at 392.
64 See Heidi Kitrosser, Public Employee Speech and Magarian’s Dynamic Diversity, 95 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1405 (2018) [hereinafter Kitrosser, Public Employee Speech]; see also Kitrosser,
supra note 8, at 302.
65 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
66 Id. at 422.
67 Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014); see also supra text accompanying note 8.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL407.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 13

29-MAY-19

on public employees and judicial buck-passing

15:35

1711

keeping agency operations from straying very far from the official images
conveyed to the public.68
Of course, the Garcetti Court did not have to invoke the “powerful network” language in order to define public employee speech value narrowly.
But doing the former enables the Court to downplay objections to the latter.
Indeed, the Court framed its reference to legislative protections as responsive
to concerns that work product speech may expose corruption or dishonesty
or otherwise prove important to public, interbranch, or intragovernmental
deliberations. In such cases, the Court suggested, the “powerful network of
legislative enactments,” along with voluntary agency practices, ethical rules,
or other protections will be available.69
Just as the Garcetti Court understated the speech values at stake, so it
overstated the relevant government interests. One interest cited by the Court
was the government’s ability to control the work product that it has itself
“commissioned or created.”70 This rationale is “wildly overbroad. While
some public employment entails conveying messages that are dictated by
one’s superiors, this is simply not true of much government work.”71 The
rationale does not apply, for instance, to the government scientist or economist ostensibly hired to apply their expertise honestly and competently. The
other government interest embraced by the Garcetti Court—the need for
supervisors to evaluate work product quality—does reflect a genuine managerial need across all areas of government employment. Yet this interest, too, is
overstated insofar as it is used to support the categorical removal of work
product speech from the reach of the First Amendment. The overstatement
“rests on the faulty assumption that judicial scrutiny of work product speech
retaliation claims must entail substantive assessments of work product quality.
To the contrary. judicial review of such claims can and should be designed to
ferret out retaliation for reasons other than work product quality.”72
The Garcetti Court’s invocation of the “powerful network” of legislative
protections enables its overstatement of the government’s interest no less
than it does the Court’s understatement of the speech value at stake. First,
insofar as the Court suggests that legislative protections cushion the practical
impact of its opinion, the point applies to the opinion’s expansive view of
government interests, just as it does to its thin conception of free speech
value. Second, in referencing a “powerful network of legislative enactments,”
the Court gestures at the notion that the political branches are best equipped
to balance the government’s complicated managerial needs against
68 Kitrosser, Public Employee Speech, supra note 64, at 1410; Kitrosser, supra note 8, at
331.
69 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425–26 (citing “powerful network of legislative enactments,”
professional ethical rules, and “additional safeguards,” including the “dictates of [employers’] sound judgment”).
70 Id. at 422 (stating that discipline for work product speech “simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created”).
71 Kitrosser, Public Employee Speech, supra note 64, at 1420 (footnote omitted).
72 Id.
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employee speech interests. The Court had relied on this point explicitly in
Bush v. Lucas, taking the view that “Congress is in a far better position than a
court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal
employees on the efficiency of the civil service.”73
Finally, the Garcetti Court’s rosy depiction of available statutory protections both reflects and helps to justify the Court’s credulousness that the
political branches will protect work product speech adequately. This Panglossian view is manifest as well in the Court’s observations that government
agencies “retain[ ] the option of instituting internal policies and procedures
that are receptive to employee criticism,”74 and that it is in their interests to
do so.75 As we saw above, the Court in Lucas made a similar point about
Congress’s incentives to protect government whistleblowers, citing Congress’s “special interest in informing itself about the efficiency and morale of
the Executive Branch.”76
Of course, the reality is far more mixed than the Court’s optimistic take
on legislative and executive measures and incentives suggests.77 The Court’s
attitude also flies in the face of a core concern that animates much free
speech theory and doctrine: a fear that government will abuse restrictions on
speech to skew public knowledge and debate in its favor.78 This fear is especially well justified where the threatened speech concerns the government’s
own operations.79 The Court’s reference to the “powerful network,” then,
implicitly aims to justify the Court’s faith that government will use its discretion over employee speech wisely and judiciously, a faith that conflicts sharply
with assumptions central to much First Amendment doctrine and theory. At
the same time, the Court’s sunny depiction of the powerful network itself
seems fueled partly by such faith.

73 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983). Similarly, in Guarnieri, the Supreme Court
explained—in arguing that public employees should receive no more protection under
the Petition Clause than the Speech Clause against retaliation for filing workplace grievances—that statutory protections are available, and “are subject to legislative revision and
can be designed for the unique needs of State, local, or Federal Governments, as well as
the special circumstances of particular governmental offices and agencies.” Borough of
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 392 (2011). Before making this point, the Court provided a “cf.” citation to Garcetti’s powerful network language. Id.; see also supra notes 62–63
and accompanying text.
74 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
75 Id. at 424–25.
76 Lucas, 462 U.S. at 389.
77 See supra Section II.A.
78 See Kitrosser, supra note 8, at 324 nn.104–06.
79 Id. at 324 n.106; see also Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and
the Paradox of Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 22, 52 (2008)
(“The debate about protecting public employees through legislation inevitably leads to
questions of whether government officials can be trusted to fully protect whistleblowers
who may report their wrongdoing.”).
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LOWER COURTS

Lower federal courts, as well as state courts, have invoked Garcetti’s reference to a “powerful network of legislative enactments” on a number of occasions since Garcetti was decided over a decade ago.80 Most often, these courts
simply and uncritically employ the language in the same way that the
Supreme Court invoked it in Garcetti. That is, they reject the plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim, but quote the language to suggest that other means of
protection may be available.81
A few examples of this phenomenon help to illustrate Garcetti’s impact
on socially valuable speech and the weight that courts have placed on the
“powerful network” as a safety net for such speech. In Green v. Board of County
Commissioners,82 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s entry of summary judgment against Jennifer Green, a former drug-lab technician and
80 On August 10, 2018, I conducted a Westlaw search for all state and federal cases
using the exact language, “powerful network of legislative enactments,” with no other
restrictions. Fifty-five cases came up, including Garcetti and Guarnieri, meaning that fiftythree lower court cases (including all state courts and lower federal courts) used the exact
term. All fifty-three cases refer to the language from Garcetti, although in some cases
courts quote subsequent opinions that themselves quote Garcetti. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794, 801 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468
F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); Johnson v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-6426,
2018 WL 1597393, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018) (quoting Ruotolo v. City of New York,
514 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2008)); Kurtzman v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 09-cv-580, 2012 WL
1805486, at *15 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2012) (quoting Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564
U.S. 379, 392 (2011)); Tessler v. Paterson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 661, 668 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(quoting Glicksman v. N.Y.C. Envtl. Control Bd., 345 Fed. App’x 688, 691 (2d Cir. 2009)).
In one case the deciding court does not place quotations around the language, but it is
clear from the context that the language comes from Garcetti. See Pearson v. District of
Columbia, 644 F. Supp. 2d 23, 45–46 (D.D.C. 2009).
81 See, e.g., Ruotolo, 514 F.3d at 186–89, 189 n.1 (noting that plaintiff did not appeal
from the district court’s conclusion that a memo for which he was disciplined was work
product speech and adding that public employees are not unprotected for their official
speech in light of the “powerful network”); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 239 n.5,
247 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding that plaintiffs spoke as employees and thus are unprotected by the First Amendment, but citing “powerful network” language to explain that
“protection from retaliation and protection under the First Amendment are mutually
exclusive considerations”); Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 543, 545–56 (6th
Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff spoke as an employee and thus has no First Amendment
protection, but quoting “powerful network” language and noting that the Supreme Court
wrote that language in response to the “potential inequity that its holding might countenance”); Perrotta v. City Sch. Dist. of Yonkers, No. 16CV9101, 2017 WL 4236565, at *2–4,
*4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (finding that plaintiff spoke pursuant to his official duties,
but adding that people in his position are “not without recourse” because of the “powerful
network”); Fritz v. Daly, No. 06-cv-191, 2006 WL 3095755, at *5–6 (D.N.H. Oct. 31, 2006)
(rejecting First Amendment claim because plaintiff spoke as an employee rather than a
citizen, but invoking “powerful network” language and stating, “[a]lthough I rule against
Fritz today, I do not suggest that a public employee who has knowledge of government
misconduct must remain silent”).
82 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
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detention officer in a county juvenile justice center.83 Green claimed that
her supervisors had retaliated against her for raising concerns about the
center’s lack of a confirmation drug testing policy and the resulting risk of
false positives.84 Among other things, Green arranged for a confirmation
test in a case that she suspected had yielded a false positive.85 The test confirmed Green’s suspicions, and she communicated the result to her supervisors.86 The court of appeals held that Green had spoken in her capacity as
an employee, and thus was unprotected by the First Amendment.87 Whether
Green’s speech was effective—indeed, her supervisors had adopted a confirmation policy after being “faced with the false positive”—made no difference.88 After all, the court observed, Garcetti and several lower court cases
applying Garcetti “also involved employees trying to focus attention on apparently misguided actions or improper situations,” and “their conduct was not
protectable under the First Amendment.”89 To the contrary, the Garcetti
Court had “acknowledged that ‘[e]xposing governmental inefficiency and
misconduct is a matter of considerable significance,’” but “concluded the
public interest was protected by other means, including a ‘powerful network
of legislative enactments.’”90
Another example comes from the Western District of Pennsylvania
where, in Baranowski v. Waters, a district court reaffirmed its earlier grant of
summary judgment against James E. Baranowski, a former police officer.91
Baranowski had arrived at the scene after another officer fatally shot a twelveyear-old boy.92 As the highest-ranking officer present in the shooting’s aftermath, Baranowski was tasked to investigate the incident.93 After completing
his report, Baranowski began to doubt the veracity of the officers who had
been present for the shooting, and he relayed his concerns to the FBI and his
supervisors.94 The court found that these communications took place pursuant to Baranowski’s official duties, and thus were unprotected by the First
Amendment.95 Before quoting Garcetti’s “powerful network” language, the
court stressed that it
does not trivialize the courage of those who seek to expose governmental
misconduct. Instead, it merely clarifies that the Constitution was never
83 Id. at 796, 801.
84 Id. at 797.
85 Id. at 796.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 801.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th
Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
91 Baranowski v. Waters, No. 05-1379, 2008 WL 4000406, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25,
2008).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at *2–3.
95 Id. at *21–22.
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meant to provide a remedy for every inappropriate action taken by a governmental official. The people of Pennsylvania, of course, remain free to
address the concerns of people in Baranowski’s position by invoking the legislative process.96

In addition to citing Garcetti to justify dismissals based on speech’s work
product status, courts also have drawn from Garcetti’s reasoning, including its
“powerful network” language, to argue that speech in particular cases does
not involve a matter of public concern. In Davis v. City of Chicago, for example, Lorenzo Davis—a former police officer, investigator, and supervisor for
the Police Review Authority—alleged that he was fired for refusing to
“change sustained findings of police misconduct.”97 The Northern District
of Illinois granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, partly on the basis that
“Davis’ written reports and findings, as well as his verbal refusals to change
such reports and findings, were made pursuant to his official duties.”98 The
court also found that because the “overall objective” of Davis’s communications related to his professional obligations, the speech “did not involve a
matter of public concern.”99 Somewhat confusingly, the court went on to
cite Garcetti’s acknowledgment that “[e]xposing governmental inefficiency
and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.”100 It reiterated,
however, that Davis’s speech was unprotected by the First Amendment, and
cited “the powerful network of legislative enactments” to which “those who
wish to expose wrongdoing” can turn.101
The Western District of Pennsylvania engaged in similar reasoning in
Mitchell v. Miller.102 Danielle Mitchell, a former cadet with the Pennsylvania
State Police (PSP), claimed that members of the PSP had retaliated against
her for complaining of gender and disability discrimination.103 The court
granted summary judgment to the defendants on Mitchell’s First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that her allegations of discrimination were
not of public concern.104 Although the court did not decide whether Mitchell had spoken as an employee, its reasoning on the public concern question
bore traces of an official speech inquiry. Citing Garcetti, the court in Mitchell
explained that “[a] critical factor in determining whether an employee’s
expression relates to a matter of public concern is whether it is fairly analogous to expressive or petitioning activities typically ‘engaged in by citizens
who do not work for the government.’”105 The court concluded its First
Amendment discussion by quoting Garcetti’s “powerful network” language to
96 Id. at *22.
97 Davis v. City of Chicago, 162 F. Supp. 3d 726, 729–30 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
98 Id. at 732.
99 Id. at 733.
100 Id. at 736 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)).
101 Id.
102 884 F. Supp. 2d 334 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
103 Id. at 347, 352.
104 Id. at 362–63, 365.
105 Id. at 363 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423).
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support the notion that “[e]mployees in Mitchell’s situation are not without
legal protection from retaliation.”106 The court also cited Guarnieri to the
effect that legislatures are better equipped than courts to formulate such
measures.107
These examples do not exhaust the array of settings in which lower
courts have deployed Garcetti’s “powerful network” language.108 They do,
however, give a sense of the language’s most typical uses. That is, to reassure
observers that, even if Garcetti’s “official speech” inquiry (and in some cases
the public concern test) preclude First Amendment protection for socially
valuable speech, employees who know of misconduct or other problems need
not “remain silent.”109
IV. THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY SPEECH
PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Much of the preceding two Parts can be summed up by stating that the
Garcetti Court, relying partly on a misplaced faith in political branch speech
protections, underprotected public employee speech. The Court demonstrated its (perhaps willful) naiveté most concretely when it assured readers
106 Id. at 365.
107 Id.
108 For example, one of the more interesting contexts in which the language arose was
a concurring opinion by Judge Cudahy of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1091–93 (7th Cir. 2006) (Cudahy, J., concurring). The
majority had cited Garcetti to help justify rejecting a political asylum claim by a former
Ukrainian prosecutor on the basis that speech engaged in as a prosecutor is not political
speech that would justify asylum. Id. at 1089–90. Cudahy concurred in the judgment but
wrote separately to object to this use of Garcetti. Id. at 1091 (Cudahy, J., concurring). He
cited Garcetti’s “powerful network” language to help explain why Garcetti’s constitutional
reasoning does not translate to the asylum context: “Even within our borders, a ‘powerful
network of legislative enactments’ extends the Constitution’s minimum protection of politically charged speech. The Immigration Act’s political asylum provisions similarly extend
that protection.” Id. at 1092 (citation omitted).
Another set of unusual examples consists of three opinions from federal district courts
within the Eleventh Circuit, two of which used virtually identical language and responded
to essentially identical motions three months apart in the same case. The courts in these
three cases did not use the “powerful network” language to help justify refusing to protect
speech. Rather, they used a longer quote of which the quoted language is a part to explain
why such speech is valuable. Smith v. Birmingham Water Works, No. CV 12-J-3493-S, 2013
WL 841331, at *4–5 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2013) (rejecting defendants’ second motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ free speech claim); Smith v. Birmingham Water Works, No. CV 12-J-3493S, 2013 WL 246018, at *6–7 (N.D. Ala. Jan, 23, 2013) (rejecting defendants’ first motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ free speech claim in same case as preceding cite); Ranck v. Rundle, No.
08-22235-CIV, 2009 WL 1684645, at *8–10, *13 (S.D. Fla. June 16, 2009) (using longer
quote to bolster notion that plaintiff’s speech was of public concern, but ultimately granting defendants’ summary judgment motion against plaintiff’s free speech claim).
109 Fritz v. Daly, No. 06-cv-191, 2006 WL 3095755, at *6 (D.N.H. Oct. 31, 2006) (citing
“powerful network” language and noting that, “[a]lthough I rule against Fritz today, I do
not suggest that a public employee who has knowledge of government misconduct must
remain silent”); see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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that a “powerful network of legislative enactments” is at the ready for “those
who seek to expose wrongdoing.”110 In portraying legislative provisions as a
bulwark rather than the “patchwork”111 that they more closely resemble, the
Court enabled the weaknesses of its own constitutional reasoning and paved
the way for lower courts to rely on its questionable depiction of the statutory
landscape.
If there is a cautionary tale to draw from these events, it is that courts
ought not to treat the actual or potential existence of political branch protections as relevant to the scope of public employees’ Free Speech Clause rights.
This is not to say that “the vagaries of state or federal law”112 ought never to
inform the nature or sweep of constitutional rights. As I suggested in Part I,
there are contexts in which such analysis may be appropriate, even necessary.
But to deem public employees’ First Amendment rights less pressing than the
former otherwise would be due to the fact or potentiality of legislative or
executive protections is to misunderstand why nonpolitical protections for
such speech are needed. At the same time, treating political branch measures as substitutes for constitutional protections obscures the important role
that they can play, not as stand-ins for constitutional protections, but as complements to them.
In Section IV.A, I elaborate on the argument that courts err in treating
political branch protections for public employee speech as actual or potential
substitutes for First Amendment protections. In Section IV.B, I discuss the
positive potential of political branch measures as complements to First
Amendment protections.
A.

The First Amendment Floor

In treating the actuality or potentiality of political branch protections as
relevant to the scope of public employees’ First Amendment rights, courts
ignore one of the foundations of much free speech theory and doctrine: that
is, fear that government will abuse censorial powers.113 The worry is especially well founded when government seeks to restrict speech about its own
operations.114 Although this concern has played little explicit role in the
modern doctrine of public employee speech protections—which can be
110 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
111 See id. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he combined variants of statutory whistleblower definitions and protections add up to a patchwork, not a showing that worries may
be remitted to legislatures for relief.”).
112 See id. at 439 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996));
see also supra notes 23–25 (citing and discussing this language).
113 Professor Frederick Schauer demonstrated that all major free speech theories share
a core distrust of government, and that this should be a central concern of free speech
doctrine. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 33–34, 44–46, 86,
162–63 (1982).
114 See Kitrosser, supra note 8, at 324–25 (offering examples to demonstrate that
“[v]igilance against government efforts to skew public knowledge and debate in its favor is
central to the Supreme Court’s understanding of the First Amendment”).
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traced back to the 1968 case of Pickering v. Board of Education115—it featured
prominently in Pickering’s most immediate antecedents. Those precedents
were a series of cases involving “the widespread efforts in the 1950’s and early
1960’s to require public employees, particularly teachers, to swear oaths of
loyalty to the State and reveal the groups with which they associated.”116 The
Court’s rejection of these efforts was “rooted partly in fears that government
will leverage its power as an employer to enforce a culture of political orthodoxy.”117 Such leveraging may prove especially tempting to officials wishing
to use it to “manipulate knowledge and criticism about themselves.”118
These fears—that government will abuse its censorial powers to protect
itself from disparagement or exposure or to enforce political orthodoxy—
militate against an attitude of sanguinity that the political branches will reliably protect public employee speech. This is not to say that the legislature and
the executive branch have no role to play in this area. To the contrary, some
important legislative achievements can occur and have occurred, as discussed
in Section IV.B. The role of the political branches is complicated, and their
political and practical incentives cut in more than one direction. But there
remain strong bases for skepticism concerning their reliability in this realm.
The government distrust rationale also cannot be fully disentangled
from the affirmative value of public employee speech, particularly the “special value of public employee speech”; that is, the unique value that employees can add to the speech marketplace by virtue of their expertise, their
access to information about their workplaces and to special channels for conveying the same. This value is grounded partly in such speech’s potential
service as a counterweight to official narratives, a service necessitated by the
potential for government abuse or incompetence.
B.
1.

A Still-Important Role for the Political Branches

The Respective Roles of Political and Constitutional Protections: An
Overview

Although the availability of political branch protections should not bear
on the scope of public employees’ First Amendment rights, the former have
significant roles to play as complements to the latter. Indeed, just as courts
must provide a backstop of protections that is independent of the whims and
incentives of the political branches, so the judiciary has its own limitations
against which political branches can provide some relief.
First, even when Garcetti does not preclude constitutional protection
entirely, courts consistently betray a reluctance to second-guess the judg115 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also Kitrosser, supra note 8, at 304–06 (tracing cases from
Pickering through Garcetti).
116 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983) (calling these cases “the precedents in
which Pickering is rooted”); see Kitrosser, supra note 8, at 312 n.42.
117 Kitrosser, supra note 8, at 313.
118 Id. at 314.
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ments of government employers.119 Indeed, one of the nation’s leading
whistleblower advocates told me in an interview that his organization, the
Government Accountability Project, determined in the 1970s—long prior to
Garcetti—that the deferential balancing test prescribed in Pickering v. Board of
Education was so weak that “[w]e had to have legislation. Whistleblower
rights were going to have to be established . . . through statute.”120
This is by no means to suggest that First Amendment protections are a
nullity for public employees or that it is not worth the effort to urge courts to
interpret them more generously. To the contrary, as I have argued throughout this Article, a floor of First Amendment protections is essential, that floor
should be determined independent of political protections, and at least one
new extension—specifically, work product speech protections—should be
added to that floor. At the same time, First Amendment protections are best
understood as a floor rather than a ceiling, and certainly not as a panacea for
public employees. One reason for this framing is the reality that courts, recognizing their distance from agencies’ day-to-day activities and pressures,
consistently defer to employers’ purported managerial judgments, and there
is little reason to think that this fundamental dynamic will change in the
foreseeable future.
Second, while the political branches themselves are hardly stalwarts for
public employee speech protections, neither are they unmitigated defenders
of employer prerogatives. Both legislative and executive branch actors have
somewhat mixed incentives in this realm. On the one hand, as I have
observed throughout this Article, there is much reason to suspect that agencies will not reliably police their own responses to employers who reveal
wrongdoing. Even if legislators can be counted on to pass forceful measures,
those provisions will rely on the executive branch for some aspects of their
enforcement. More so, the executive branch will have a strong hand in negotiating any legislation given presidential or gubernatorial veto power. Meaningful reform also may be less likely where the same party controls the
executive and the legislature.
At the same time, the concept of public employee protections—particularly whistleblower protections—has some real political purchase. Indeed, a
theme that I heard repeatedly in interviewing whistleblower advocates, as well
as current and former oversight staffers from both parties on Capitol Hill, is
that whistleblower protections—at least in the abstract—command strong
bipartisan support.121 Certainly, executive branch employers have reputa119 See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 151–52 (“[A] wide degree of deference to the
employer’s judgment is appropriate.”); Tony M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of
Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (“[C]ourts defer broadly—
often decisively—to the government employer’s need for disciplinary discretion.”).
120 Interview with Louis Clark, Gov’t Accountability Project, in Washington, D.C. (Dec.
7, 2017).
121 See, e.g., Interview with Elise Bean, former longtime staffer to Democratic Senator
Carl Levin, in Arlington, Va. (May 21, 2018); Interview with Mark Cohen, former Principal
Deputy Special Counsel, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, and former Executive Director,
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tional incentives to convey the message that they have nothing to hide, and
that they welcome constructive feedback from employees. Both legislative
and executive branch actors thus have incentives, at minimum, to pay lip
service to public employee speech protections. Under the right circumstances, those incentives can turn into meaningful pressure to do more than
just talk.
Third, constitutional protections, however robust, are poor vehicles for
granular rules as opposed to broadly applicable standards. Thus, while
courts might be well advised to apply the Pickering balance test with less deference than they have applied it in the past, they surely will continue to apply it
or some similar balancing mechanism. The policymaking realm, on the
other hand, is conducive to more intricate fine-tuning; for example, to identifying particular types of information disclosures and according them absolute protection. At the same time, this feature of policymaking illustrates yet
another reason why a consistent backstop of constitutional protections is
needed. That is, whereas statutes might provide fine-grained protections—
absolutely protecting disclosures on some topics, for instance, while leaving
others unprotected—constitutional law, with its relatively sweeping tests and
standards, is better suited to broad, if in some respects, thinner coverage.122
2.

Two Examples from the Realm of Federal Statutory Protections

Two examples of the CSRA’s whistleblower protections and their history
illustrate lawmakers’ mixed incentives, the resulting hit-or-miss nature of the
legislative process for whistleblower protections, and the relationships
between legislative and constitutional protections.
First, under the current iteration of the CSRA, a supervisor may not take
a prohibited personnel action against an employee or applicant “because of”
information disclosures that the employee or applicant “reasonably believes
evidences . . . any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,” or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety.”123 A disclosure’s protected status
is not contingent on case-by-case balancing—that is, on whether its value outweighs the employer’s efficiency interests. At the same time, disclosures on
other topics, however valuable, receive no protection under the law. The
resulting coverage gap is illustrated by a remark made to me in an interview
by attorney Katherine Atkinson, who represents Joel Clement, a former Interior Department scientist and policy analyst. Clement allegedly was retaliated
against for sharing his views that certain Native Alaskan villages are “sliding
Gov’t Accountability Project, in Arlington, Va. (May 24, 2018); Interview with longtime
congressional investigator who has worked closely with whistleblowers (I agreed not to
name them due to their concerns over office publicity policies) in Washington, D.C. (May
23, 2018); Telephone Interview with longtime Republican congressional staffer (Apr. 11,
2018) (I agreed not to name them due to their concerns over office publicity policies).
122 Cf. Garcia, supra note 79, at 35–40 (pointing to relative spottiness of statutory
coverage).
123 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL407.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 23

29-MAY-19

on public employees and judicial buck-passing

15:35

1721

into the sea” due to climate change, and that the villagers must be relocated.124 Atkinson explained that Clement’s case is “just incredible” insofar
as it features a disclosure about climate change in which the “threat to the
American public [is] sufficiently specific,” given the direct and imminent
danger faced by Alaskan Native populations. In contrast, Atkinson said, “[i]f
ten people from EPA came to me today” regarding other climate change
disclosures, “I would have to say, ‘you have no case,’” because the statute
demands disclosure of a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety.125 The CSRA’s narrow but deep coverage of a few types of disclosures
marks an instance of legislative fine-tuning. It also illustrates the need for
constitutional backstops to protect potentially valuable speech to which finegrained legislation might not extend.
Second, between 1998 and 2012, the statutory provision invoked by
Clement would not have applied to him, because his alleged disclosures were
part of his official duties.126 The official duties exclusion was imposed by the
Federal Circuit in a controversial 1998 opinion.127 Congress reversed this
judgment in the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of
2012, clarifying that disclosures may not be excluded from protection
because they were “made during the normal course of duties of an
employee.”128 The Senate Report accompanying the WPEA stated that “the
Federal Circuit has wrongly accorded a narrow definition to the type of disclosure that qualifies for whistleblower protection,” and that the WPEA
“address[es] these problems by restoring the original congressional intent of
the [1989 Whistleblower Protection Act].”129
The WPEA illustrates Congress’s capacity to provide meaningful
whistleblower protections, including those that bypass judicially imposed limits.130 At the same time, the fourteen-year span between the Federal Circuit’s
124 Joel Clement, Complaint of Possible Prohibited Personnel Practice or Other Prohibited Activity, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, at 6 (July 12, 2017) (on file with author).
125 Interview with Katherine Atkinson, Partner, Wilkenfeld, Herendeen & Atkinson,
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 7, 2017).
126 See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 § 101(f)(2), 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9) (2012) (amending the law to protect such disclosures); Jason Zuckerman,
Congress Strengthens Whistleblower Protections for Federal Employees, ABA LEL FLASH, Nov.–Dec.
2012 (explaining that this 2012 amendment was necessary to close the restriction on protection for whistleblowers imposed by a 1998 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
127 Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
128 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 § 101(b)(2), 5 U.S.C.
§2302(f)(2); see also Zuckerman, supra note 126.
129 S. REP. NO. 112-155, at 1–3 (2012); see also Zuckerman, supra note 126 (explaining
that “several Federal Circuit decisions . . . creat[ed] loopholes that were contrary to Congressional intent,” and WPEA closed those loopholes.); Interview with Louis Clark, supra
note 120 (making similar points).
130 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. In addition to reversing the official
duties exclusion, the WPEA reversed Federal Circuit holdings that had deemed disclosures
unprotected if they were made “to a supervisor or to a person who participated in the
[disclosed] activity,” or “not . . . in writing.” See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act
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decision and the WPEA’s passage, and the six-year gap between Garcetti’s
exclusion of work product speech from First Amendment coverage and the
WPEA’s partial protection of the same, illustrates the contingent nature of
such progress. Indeed, Congress had considered, and civil society groups
had sought earlier versions of the WPEA for more than a decade prior to the
law’s eventual passage.131 More so, “in each of the four congressional sessions prior to 2011–12,” the WPEA had “passed by Unanimous Consent in
both chambers” of Congress.132 Each time, however, the legislation died
when a secret hold was placed on it in the Senate.133 The WPEA’s eventual
passage was facilitated partly by media attention, including a crowdsourcing
effort launched jointly by the National Public Radio program On the Media
and the Government Accountability Project to ferret out the source of the
secret hold.134
That the WPEA ultimately did pass is a testament, among other things,
to the political resonance of public employee whistleblower protections. The
difficulties encountered in its passage, however, coupled with continuing
gaps in coverage and enforcement,135 offer a glimpse of the political
branches’ intrinsic limits in protecting public employee speakers, and the
ever-green need for a protective constitutional floor.
CONCLUSION
In an alarming turn of events that occurred during this Article’s final
editing stages, the MSPB—which had been without a quorum since January
2017—lost its final member when his term expired on March 1, 2019.136
of 2012 § 101(b)(2)(C), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(A), (D); see also Zuckerman, supra note 126
(citing these changes). The WPEA also created a pilot program that opened review of
whistleblower appeals to all U.S. circuit courts. Congress recently extended that program
indefinitely. See Make It Safe Coalition Praises Congressional Approval of the All Circuit Review
Act, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (June 25, 2018), https://www.whistleblower.org/
press/make-it-safe-coalition-praises-congressional-approval-all-circuit-review-act/.
131 In 2006, for example, very shortly after Garcetti was decided, the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform held a hearing entitled, What Price Free Speech? Whistleblowers
and the Ceballos Decision, in which several representatives and civil society advocates suggested that new legislation was needed. See Hearings, supra note 58.
132 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
(May 9, 2018) (emphasis omitted), https://www.whistleblower.org/uncategorized/whistle
blower-protection-enhancement-act-wpea/.
133 Id.
134 Blow the Whistle!, WNYC, https://www.wnyc.org/blowthewhistle (last visited Feb. 22,
2019).
135 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
136 Eric Katz, Federal Employee Appeals Board’s Doomsday Has Arrived, GOV’T EXECUTIVE
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2019/02/federal-employeeappeals-boards-doomsday-has-arrived/155216/ [hereinafter Katz, Doomsday]; Eric Katz,
MSPB Likely to Remain Powerless as Senate Panel Fails to Advance Trump’s Nominees, GOV’T
EXECUTIVE (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2018/11/mspb-likelyremain-powerless-senate-panel-fails-advance-trumps-nominees/153100/ [hereinafter Katz,
MSPB].
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Given the Board’s central role in adjudicating whistleblower claims under the
CSRA,137 its 2000 backlogged cases (as of March 2019)138 as well as future
cases that would normally reach it, are in an unprecedented state of
limbo.139
This episode exemplifies—albeit in unusually dramatic fashion—the relative vulnerability of administrative processes—and of politically crafted remedies more broadly—to political headwinds.140 This is not to suggest that
constitutional adjudication by Article III courts is itself unimpeachable, or
that political branch protections cannot play important roles in protecting
whistleblowers or speech freedoms more broadly. It should serve, however,
as a cautionary tale; an admonition that the scope of public employees’ constitutional speech protections ought not to hinge on the vigor, whether real
or imagined, of those rights bestowed by the political branches.

137 See supra notes 44–47.
138 Katz, Doomsday, supra note 136.
139 Evan Osnos, Trump vs. The “Deep State,” NEW YORKER (May 21, 2018), https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state (“Since 1979, the board
has never been without a quorum for longer than a few weeks.”).
140 Nominations to the Board were held up due partly to partisan political concerns,
including a desire by Senate Republicans to ensure that their party would hold a Board
majority. Katz, MSPB, supra note 136 (quoting Republican Senator Ron Johnson to this
effect). One prominent whistleblower advocate also speculated that “[t]he Trump philosophy is they just don’t want the agency to function at all.” Osnos, supra note 139 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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